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BOOK REVIEWS

The Divine Order, the Human Order, and the Order of Nature: Historical Perspectives, edited by Eric Watkins. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
288 pages. $74.00 (hardcover).
JULIE WALSH, Université du Québec à Montréal
In his introduction to this rich collection of essays, Eric Watkins notes that
a growing dissatisfaction with the limits of the traditional rationalist/empiricist distinction has, in recent years, led a number of scholars to focus on
other possible narrative structures for studying the evolution of thought
throughout the modern period. Watkins suggests that the narrative of
order is particularly promising because a philosopher’s understanding of
natural and moral laws, their justification, and their consequences, can
unite the most central considerations of any philosophical system of the
period: metaphysics, epistemology, science, and morality. In this way, the
focus on order avoids the pitfalls of other narratives that focus on theoretical issues to the exclusion of practical ones or vice versa. Thus the aim of
the volume is to “suggest an outline for an original account of the history
of modern western European thought, one that is based on the centrality
of, and relations among, different notions of order (the natural, moral,
divine, and human)” (xxvi).
The volume begins with two essays on the medieval period from
Marilyn McCord Adams and Steven Nadler. Adams provides a detailed
discussion of Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham on the connection between
the natural and divine order. While causal powers explain natural phenomena for these medievals, Adams notes that these thinkers all thought
that the natural order is ultimately subordinated to the divine order. This
is because God determines which powers exist, the extent to which they
are expressed, and the content of the laws decreed to voluntary agents
according to His ends. Of particular interest is Adams’s discussion of the
fact that these authors accept the possibility that God may change the
content of the laws according to the state of human beings (viz. pre- or
post-lapsarian), thus highlighting the role of God’s ends in the decree of
positive and moral law.
pp. 486–490
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In his chapter, Nadler defends an interpretation of Maimonides according to which the righteous person is literally protected from all manner of
evil. Maimonides claims that through intellectual perfection, characterized
as a turning towards God, human beings merit a kind of providence that
is described as an “overflow” of knowledge from God. This knowledge,
Nadler argues, contains the knowledge of natural laws, which provides
insight into causal connections. This knowledge thus endows the righteous
with the power to predict natural phenomena. So, knowing the divine
order gives knowledge of natural laws, which in turn reduces or eliminates
the chance of harm.
The early modern section contains six essays. In the first, Daniel Garber
compares two systems that ground the order of nature in God—Descartes
and Leibniz—with two that do not—Hobbes and Spinoza. After canvassing
the arguments for grounding the order of nature in divine will (Descartes)
and in divine reason (Leibniz) Garber uses the “order of geometry” to
explain the ground of the order of nature for Hobbes and Spinoza. Importantly, Hobbes and Spinoza do not appeal to God to explain the nature
of motion. Garber notes that, instead, Hobbes takes motion to be part of
the domain of geometry and Spinoza seems to suggest that the laws of
matter and motion have the same status as laws of geometry. Garber thus
concludes that Hobbes and Spinoza agree that the order of nature is nothing more than a fact about the world that is no way subordinated to a
higher order.
By contrast, everything about the natural order is subordinated to the
divine order in Malebranche’s world, which is taken up by Robert Merrihew Adams in the next chapter. There, Adams takes on the difficult task
of carefully delineating the many causal concepts at play in Malebranche’s
occasionalist universe. Of particular note is Adams’s illuminating discussion of the difficult distinction between divine practical volitions and mere
willings. The treatment of the various causal notions in Malebranche’s
system is oriented towards an ultimate discussion of what falls outside
the scope of these causal concepts, namely, the nature of created freedom. Adams suggests that while all “things” fall under the authority of
the divine substance, free acts or “non-things” fall under the authority of
created-mind substances. While Adams is surely right about this, the most
vexed question in Malebranche scholarship remains: what is entailed by
a conception of freedom that has “no-thing” as its expression? While this
question is not answered by Adams, his work to decorticate the concepts
involved in the discussion is essential for future studies.
The discussion of Malebranche continues in Tad Schmaltz’s chapter devoted to a comparison of the centrality of general laws in Malebranche,
Berkeley, and Hume. He demonstrates that while all three see general
laws as central to the natural and moral orders, for Hume they derive
from primitive features of human nature (“custom” and “moral sentiments”) while Malebranche and Berkeley ground them in divine action.
But while Berkeley’s God determines the content of these laws in terms of
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His concern for the welfare of His creation, Malebranche’s God only ever
acts for His own glory. Thus, for Hume, the human order determines the
natural and moral orders while for Malebranche and Berkeley they are
determined by the divine order.
We then return to the Cartesian conception of laws in Peter Harrison’s
very engaging discussion of (1) the reaction of the Cambridge Platonists
against Descartes’s understanding of the order of nature and the way they
attempted to improve upon it, and (2) the response of several Newtonians to
this improvement. Harrison notes that the central problem for both groups
is the “hypothetical” character of the laws of nature. The Cambridge Platonists thought that deriving the laws from the immutability of God’s will,
as Descartes did, amounts to appealing to a theoretical model to explain
phenomena. Moreover, taking the laws to be immutable seemed to make
them almost “brute facts,” thus threatening the role of divine providence
in nature. To reduce these tensions, they posited “plastick natures”—spiritual intermediaries that contain the laws of nature. While reinstating a role
for divine providence, plastick natures were seen by the Newtonians as
just another unexplained “hypothesis” or theoretical model. For their part,
they emphasized the importance of observation and experimentation to
discover and justify the laws of nature while at the same time holding that
the laws are grounded in the will of God.
The early modern section concludes with two papers on Leibniz. In the
first, Donald Rutherford argues that powers and laws are equally explanatorily basic for Leibniz. The laws of nature are chosen by God, Leibniz
says, but only operate in virtue of being grounded in the powers of finite
substances. These powers are, in their turn, governed by laws decreed
by God. Rutherford offers a persuasive interpretation according to which
the laws governing monadic change do so according to the next best state
for the universe to be in and so “the laws that explain the evolution of a
monad’s perceptions could be the physical laws of nature” (171). Thus, to
explain the laws of nature we appeal to the powers of finite substances
which are in turn explained, at least in part, by these very laws.
In the second Leibniz chapter, Martha Brandt Bolton also considers
the question of monadic change and argues that the laws governing such
change are characterized by desire-like final causes. The central problem
with this kind of position is most often expressed in terms of the problem
of Bayle’s dog: a dog is happily chewing a bone when he suddenly receives a blow. It seems that if all substantial change is explained by desirelike final causes, we have to conclude that the dog desires the blow, which
seems absurd. Bolton defuses this tension by underlining the fact that the
rational soul desires the harmony of regularity. Thus, the dog desires the
harmony of which the blow is a part. This allows Bolton to conclude that
nature is ordered in such a way that changes in the monad reflect the
good in the created world because all such changes represent the desire
for harmony.
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The final two chapters in the collection address Kant. Andrew Chignell
offers a very interesting argument in favour of a central role for hope in
Kant’s moral philosophy. The problem is that Kant seems simultaneously
to hold that to be virtuous and thus happy, human beings must perform
a revolution of will for which we are radically and ultimately responsible,
and that such a revolution is impossible without divine assistance. Chignell
notes that according to Kant, whether and if so how the combination of
individual effort and divine assistance leads to happiness is something
that is incomprehensible to us. But, importantly, Chignell suggests that
“incomprehensible” does not mean “really impossible.” While “assistance
in the moral life may be unknowable and even inconceivable . . . that’s not
sufficient for being certain of its impossibility” because “inconceivability
must not track real impossibility for Kant” (214). Chignell concludes that
the “moral miracle” expressed by the divine concursus needed to perform
the revolution of will is not something we can rationally expect (just as we
cannot rationally expect miracles in the physical realm) but is something
for which we can rationally hope.
The moral order in Kant is further explored by Eric Watkins. While the
contributions from human beings to the moral and natural orders remain
fundamental in Kant’s system, Watkins suggests that the divine order
has a foundational role in three ways: God is the most real being who
grounds the possibility of all things (first Critique), God grounds the highest moral good by proportioning happiness to virtue (second Critique) and
God proportions happiness to virtue by subordinating mechanical laws to
teleological laws (third Critique). In this way, Watkins shows that despite
Kant’s break with the tradition of the early modern period, his system still
shares an important feature with his predecessors: the importance of the
divine order.
By structuring its discussions around conceptions of order, this volume
takes its place alongside a small but growing group of works published in
the last fifteen years that explore this narrative in the history of philosophy, among which the work of historian of science Lorraine Daston is central. This volume is a welcome addition to this group in particular for its
treatment of the connections between divine, moral, and natural orders.
Where the volume is less successful is in the discussion of how to understand the role and scope of the “human order.” Custom and moral
sentiment for Hume and the concepts of the understanding for Kant are
features of human nature and thus of the human order that are centrally
involved in natural and moral orders. But aside from these thinkers, the
discussion of human order seems always to collapse into the moral order.
Conspicuously absent is a recognition of the human order as political
order. Many early modern thinkers were influenced by the natural law
theories of Suárez, Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf. A more complete
picture of the “human order” in early modern philosophy would need
to involve an analysis of positive law and its justification. A discussion
of political order would also facilitate the inclusion of thinkers outside
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the canon. For instance, Margaret Cavendish’s and Mary Astell’s writings
about social and metaphysical liberty provide important insight into the
link between the human and moral order in early modern Europe.
But this criticism is by no means meant to indicate that the aim of the
volume is not met. Watkins has done an excellent job of demonstrating the
richness and promise of the narrative of order. The volume should serve as
a call to specialists and advanced students in the field to develop and extend these themes within the systems discussed here and to other thinkers
in the history of philosophy.

Solved by Sacrifice: Austin Farrer, Fideism, and the Evidence of Faith, by Robert
MacSwain. Leuven: Peeters, 2013. xiii + 275 pages. $88.74 (paper).
BRIAN HEBBLETHWAITE, Queens’ College, Cambridge
This book is unquestionably a major contribution to the study of Austin
Farrer’s writings and to philosophical reflection on the topic of faith and
reason. It still betrays its origin in a doctoral dissertation, but its thoroughness in knowledge of relevant sources and background, and of fascinating
biographical detail about Farrer, is most impressive. One cannot resist a
wry smile, however, at the presence of so many long footnotes in a book
about an author who forswore footnotes altogether.
Austin Farrer, regarded by many as the leading Anglican philosophical
theologian of the twentieth century, was for many years Fellow and Chaplain of Trinity College, Oxford. He ended his career as Warden of Keble.
His many books include Finite and Infinite, The Glass of Vision, The Freedom
of the Will, Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited, Saving Belief, A Science of God?,
and Faith and Speculation. What has impressed his colleagues, pupils, hearers (he was a great preacher too), and readers was the way in which he
combined philosophical skill, theological acumen, and profound spirituality. Readers of MacSwain’s book will want to ask whether a sufficiently
balanced picture of Farrer’s many-sidedness is maintained.
The title of the book should first be explained. “Solved by Sacrifice—solvitur immolando” was Farrer’s parody of the solution to Zeno’s well-known
paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise, which “solvitur ambulando,” that is,
is solved by carrying on walking and overtaking the tortoise, not by continuously stopping and thinking at fifty per cent segments of the distance
behind. Similarly, Farrer urges (in a sermon, be it noted), Christian faith
finds its justification, not in logic or argument, but in actually following
the way of the cross and finding spiritual blessedness thereby. This is
manifestly true of the saints and up to a point of the ordinary believer
pp. 490–492
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